报告题目：Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous  Bidders

　　报 告 人：李彤教授（美国Vanderbilt大学经济系）

　　报告时间：2010年6月29日下午4:15

　　报告地点：管理科研楼1018会议室

　　主办单位：管理学院统计与金融系

　　

　　欢迎所有感兴趣者参与！

　　摘要 

　　In this paper we study the timber sales auctions in Oregon. We propose an entry and bidding model within the affiliated private value (APV) framework  and with heterogeneous bidders, and establish existence of the entry equilibrium and existence and uniqueness of the bidding equilibrium with the joint distribution of private values belonging to the class of Archimedean  copulas. We then estimate the resulting structural model, and find that the hauling distance plays a significant role in bidders’.entry and bidding decisions. We quantify the extent to which the potential bidders’.private values and entry costs are affiliated. The structural estimates are then 

　　used to conduct counterfactual analyses to address policy related issues. In particular, we quantify the effects of reserve price, affiliation, and  merger on the end auction outcomes.